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ABSTENTION AND MANDAMUS
AFTER WILL V. CALVERT FIRE INSURANCE CO.
Federal courts have recognized several justifications for de-
clining to hear cases within their jurisidiction. Each of these jus-
tifications is embodied in a branch of the federal abstention doc-
trine. Recently, in Colorado River Water Conservation District v.
United States,' the Supreme Court propagated a new branch-
abstention for the convenience of the federal courts. 2 A crop of
unresolved issues sprouted from Colorado River, among them the
propriety of stays for judicial convenience 3 and of appellate re-
view through a petition for mandamus of a district court's deci-
sion to abstain. The Court addressed both these issues in Will v.
Calvert Fire Insurance Co.4 This Note assesses Calvert's impact on
the abstention doctrine and on the availability of writs of man-
damus.
I
DEVELOPMENT OF THE POWER TO STAY
A. Traditional Doctrine
Since 1821 the federal courts have professed that they must
hear all cases over which they have jurisdiction. In Cohens v. Vir-
ginia,5 Chief Justice Marshall announced in dictum:
It is most true that this court will not take jurisdiction if it
should not; but it is equally true, that it must take jurisdiction if
it should. The judiciary cannot, as the legislature may, avoid a
measure because it approaches the confines of the constitution
.... We have no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdic-
tion which is given, than to usurp that which is not given. The
one or the other would be treason to the constitution.'
The Supreme Court has consistently paid lip service to this obliga-
tion to exercise jurisdiction,7  but it has been substantially under-
cut by the growth of the abstention doctrine.
1 424 U.S. 800 (1976).
2 But see C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 52, at 229 (3d ed.
1976) (Colorado River rule for exceptional, nonroufine cases only).
3 Colorado River involved a dismissal, not a stay.
4 437 U.S. 655 (1978).
5 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821).
6 Id. at 404.
7 See, e.g., Colorado River Water Conserv. Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817
19791 ABSTENTION AND MANDAMUS 567
The abstention doctrine branches in four directions. Railroad
Commission v. Pullman Co.,8 the seminal case for the first branch,
declared that federal courts should avoid the premature adjudica-
tion of constitutional issues. 9 A second branch is reflected in
Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux. 10 In approving a
stay of a federal action, the Court deferred to the state's interest
in having its own courts resolve difficult questions of state law
involving policies of substantial local import." The third branch
(1976) (dictum) (referring to "the virtually unflagging obligation of the federal courts to
exercise the jurisdiction given them"); McClellan v. Garland, 217 U.S. 268, 282 (1910)
("the pendency of an action in the state court is no bar to proceedings concerning the same
matter in the Federal court having jurisdiction"); Willcox v. Consolidated Gas Co., 212 U.S.
19, 40 (1909) ("When a federal court is properly appealed to in a case over which it has by
law jurisdiction, it is its duty to take such jurisdiction.
8 312 U.S. 496 (1941).
' Pullman and its black porters brought a suit for an injunction, claiming that the
Texas Railroad Commission, by issuing a discrimination order, had exceeded its authority
under state law and had violated the fourteenth amendment and the commerce clause of
the United States Constitution. Id. at 498. The Supreme Court held that the district court
should have abstained from hearing the action until the Texas courts had determined the
legality of the challenged Commission order:
In this situation a federal court of equity is asked to decide an issue by making
a tentative answer which may be displaced tomorrow by a state adjudication
.... The resources of equity are equal to an adjustment that will avoid the
waste of a tentative decision as well as the friction of a premature constitutional
adjudication.
Id. at 500.
Pullman abstention thus directs the federal district court to abstain from deciding fed-
eral constitutional claims until a state court has resolved unclear, potentially dispositive
state law issues. The federal forum keeps the action on its calendar until the state court
renders a final judgment. If the federal plaintiff wins in state court, the constitutional issue
is effectively mooted and the federal case may be dismissed. Otherwise, the federal plaintiff
returns to federal court. For discussion of the purposes underlying Pullman abstention, see
Bezanson, Abstention: The Supreme Court and Allocation of Judicial Power, 27 VAND. L. REv.
1107, 1113-16 (1974). See generally C. WRIGHT, supra note 2, § 52, at 218-21 (3d ed. 1976);
Field, Abstention in Constitutional Cases: The Scope of the Pullman Abstention Doctrine, 122 U. PA.
L. REV. 1071, 1077-79 (1974).
10 360 U.S. 25 (1959).
11 In City of Thibodaux, a Louisiana municipality initiated an eminent domain proceed-
ing against the petitioner power and light company in state court. Petitioner removed the
action to federal district court on the basis of diversity of citizenship. The federal judge
stayed the proceeding pending before him, but the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
reversed. Reinstating the district court order, the Supreme Court commented:
A determination of the nature and extent of delegation of the power of emi-
nent domain concerns the apportionment of governmental powers between City
and State. The issues normally turn on legislation with much local variation
interpreted in local settings....
The special nature of eminent domain justifies a district judge, when his
familiarity with the problems of local law so counsels him, to ascertain the
meaning of a disputed state statute from the only tribunal empowered to speak
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has grown primarily from the Court's more 'recent holdings in
Younger v. Harris 12 and Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd.13  This branch
prohibits federal courts from interfering with pending state ac-
tions involving the enforcement of important state laws, and turns
on principles of comity.1
4
The three traditional branches of the abstention doctrine thus
limit a federal plaintiff's absolute right to a federal forum for
reasons other than the costs inherent in duplicative litigation.
Abstention's fourth branch, on which this Note will focus, reflects
concern for those costs and the convenience of the federal courts.
B. Origins of the Fourth Branch
In Landis v. North American Co. 5 the Supreme Court recog-
nized power inherent in federal district courts to stay their own
proceedings in deference to actions pending in other federal
courts. The Court's rationale turned on considerations of judicial
economy and convenience." But application of Landis to stays in
deference to state proceedings was hampered by Meredith v. Winter
Haven.17  In Meredith, the Supreme Court declared that stays in
definitively-the courts of the State under whose statute eminent domain is
sought to be exercised-rather than himself make a dubious and tentative
forecast.
Id. at 28-29.
City of Thibodaux approved deferral to a state tribunal for a determinative ruling on
state policy of first impression. The Supreme Court has also upheld abstention where fed-
eral review of a question would disrupt state efforts to establish a coherent policy on mat-
ters of local concern. See, e.g., Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943). Burford and
similar cases arose primarily in the context of state administrative law, leading some com-
mentators to recognize a separate category of "administrative abstention." See Field, supra
note 9, at 1153-63. See generally P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO, & H. WECHSLER, HART
& WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 999-1004 (2d ed. 1973)
[hereinafter cited as HART & WECHSLER].
12 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
13 420 U.S. 592 (1975).
" See generally C. WRIGHT, supra note 2, § 52, at 229-36; Field, supra note 9, at 1163-87;
Redish, The Doctrine of Younger v. Harris: Deference in Search of a Rationale, 63 CORNELL L.
REv. 463 (1978).
15 299 U.S. 248 (1936).
16 [T]he power to stay proceedings is incidental to the power inherent in every
court to control the disposition of the causes on its docket with economy of
time and effort for itself, for counsel, and for litigants. How this can best be
done calls for the exercise of judgment, which must weigh competing interests
and maintain an even balance.
Id. at 254-55.
17 320 U.S. 228 (1943).
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such circumstances were permissible only on certain clearly estab-
lished grounds. Convenience was not among these grounds.1
8
A number of lower courts evaded Meredith and embraced
Landis. In Mottolese v. Kaufman l9 the Second Circuit granted its
trial courts broad discretionary power to stay, citing the principles
of fairness which underlie the doctrine of forum non conveniens 20
and the goal of preventing a multiplicity of suits.2 The Fourth
Circuit has since adopted the Mottolese rationale.22 The Seventh
Circuit, in Aetna State Bank v. Altheimer,2 3 reached a similar result,
relying on the court's inherent power, recognized in Landis, "to
control the disposition of the causes on its docket with economy of
time and effort for itself, for counsel and for litigants." 24 In PPG
Industries, Inc. v. Continental Oil Co.,25 the Fifth Circuit questioned
Mottolese insofar as it applied to actions at law, but recognized
broad power to stay federal suits seeking equitable and declara-
s The Court stated that federal jurisdiction over state law questions, if properly in-
voked, must be exercised, absent "exceptional circumstances." Id. at 234. "Exceptional cir-
cumstances" sufficient to justify non-exercise of jurisdiction were limited to "recognized pub-
lic polic[ies] or defined principle[s]." Id. (emphasis added). In 1943, these categories did not
include convenience of the federal courts. See id. at 234-37.
19 176 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1949).
20 Id. at 303. The doctrine offorum non conveniens provides that a federal court may, in
its discretion, transfer an action to another eligible forum if such transfer best serves the
interests of the parties and the public. See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 507-09
(1947). See generally C. WRIGHT, supra note 2, § 44, at 185-86; Comment, Federal Court Stays
and Dismissals in Deference to Parallel State Court Proceedings: The Impact of Colorado River, 44
U. CH. L. Rav. 641, 647-48 (1977).
21 176 F.2d at 303. Chief Judge Learned Hand interpreted Meredith to mean that a
defendant must show "some positive reason why the federal action should not proceed,"
and found economy and convenience to be such reasons. Id. For a discussion of Mottolese,
see Note, Stays of Federal Proceedings in Deference to Concurrently Pending State Court Suits, 60
COLUM. L. REv. 684, 686-87 (1960); Note, Power to Decline the Exercise of Federal Jurisdiction,
37 MINN. L. REv. 46, 58-61 (1952); Comment, supra note 20, at 654; Note, Power to Stay
Federal Proceedings Pending Termination of Concurrent State Litigation, 59 YALE LJ. 978,
982-91 (1950); 19 U. CHI. L. Rav. 361, 369-71 (1952).
22 Amdur v. Lizars, 372 F.2d 103, 107 (4th Cir. 1967).
23 430 F.2d 750 (7th Cir. 1970). The Seventh Circuit overruled Aetna in Calvert Fire
Ins. Co. v. Will, 560 F.2d 792, 796 (7th Cir. 1977), rev'd, 437 U.S. 655 (1978). The court
viewed Aetna as incompatible with a subsequent Supreme Court case, Colorado River Water
Conserv. Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976). The court of appeals denied a rehear-
ing en banc on the question of overruling Aetna. Judge Pell filed a dissenting statement in
which he reconciled Aetna and Colorado River, noting that the former involved a stay rather
than a dismissal and therefore justified broader trial court discretion. 560 F.2d 796-97 n.5.
The Supreme Court's reversal of the Seventh Circuit's judgment in Will v. Calvert Fire Ins.
Co., 437 U.S. 655 (1978), presumably restored vitality to Aetna.
24 430 F.2d at 755 (quoting Landis, 299 U.S. at 254).
25 478 F.2d 674 (5th Cir. 1973).
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tory relief in deference to parallel state proceedings. 26 Although
PPG did not mention forum non conveniens, it offered four ends
that could justify this means: preservation of harmonious federal-
state relations, judicial economy, convenience to litigants, and
avoidance of races to judgment. 7 Finally, in Weiner v. Shearson,
Hammill & Co., 28 the Ninth Circuit recited the reasons set forth in
PPG,2 9 but used them to support the stay of an action at law.
30
Thus, prior to the Supreme Court's holding in Colorado River
Water Conservation District v. United States,31 five circuits recognized
at least some 32 discretionary power to stay federal actions for
reasons of economy and convenience.
C. The Colorado River Standard
In Colorado River, a federal district court deferred to a paral-
lel state proceeding and dismissed a suit brought under the
McCarran Amendment33 to adjudicate federal water rights. The
Supreme Court upheld the dismissal, differentiating Colorado
River from cases reflecting the three traditional forms of absten-
tion: 34
Although this case falls within none of the abstention
categories, there are principles unrelated to considerations of
proper constitutional adjudication and regard for federal-state
relations which govern in situations involving the contem-
poraneous exercise of concurrent jurisdictions, either by federal
26 Id. at 681-82.
27 Id. at 679-80. For a helpful critique of the PPG rationale, see 51 TEXAS L. Rav. 1252
(1973).
28 521 F.2d 817 (9th Cir. 1975).
29 Id. at 820.
30 Id. at 821.
31 424 U.S. 800 (1976).
32 In addition to the Fifth Circuites hesitation concerning actions at law (see text accom-
panying note 26 supra), some circuits balked when asked to approve abstention in cases
within exclusive federal jurisdiction. See, e.g., Cotler v. Inter-County Orthopaedic Ass'n,
526 F.2d 537, 542 n.1 (3d Cir. 1975); Mach-tronics, Inc. v. Zirpoli, 316 F.2d 820, 833-34
(9th Cir. 1963); Lyons v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 222 F.2d 184, 189-90 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 350 U.S. 825 (1955); Telechron, Inc. v. Parissi, 197 F.2d 757 (2d Cir. 1952). But see
Saler v. Renaire Foods, Inc., 283 F. Supp. 297 (E.D. Pa. 1968) (staying federal csecurities
claim in deference to state court determination of state claims). In other cases convenience
and economy justified stays but not outright dismissals. See, e.g., Weiner v. Shearson,
Hammill & Co., 521 F.2d 817, 821-22 (9th Cir. 1975); Aetna State Bank v. Altheimer, 430
F.2d 750, 756 (7th Cir. 1970), overruled in Calvert Fire Ins. Co. v. Will, 560 F.2d 792, 796
(7th Cir. 1977), rev'd, 437 U.S. 655 (1978).
33 43 U.S.C. § 666 (1976).
34 424 U.S. at 813-17.
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courts or by state and federal courts. These principles rest on
considerations of "[w]ise judicial administration, giving regard
to conservation of judicial resources and comprehesive disposi-
tion of litigation." -5
The Court, however, emphasized "the virtually unflagging obliga-
tion of the federal courts to exercise the jurisdiction given
them," 36 and added that only exceptional circumstances can jus-
tify dismissal for reasons of economy and convenience. The
factors that district courts should balance, in their discretion,"
against their "heavy obligation to exercise jurisdiction" 39 include
"the inconvenience of the federal forum, ... the desirability of
avoiding piecemeal litigation, . .. and the order in which jurisdic-
tion was obtained by the concurrent forums." 40 Thus, while un-
derscoring the federal courts' responsibility to exercise jurisdic-
tion, the Supreme Court renewed its support of the fourth branch
of abstention.
II
THE PROPRIETY OF APPELLATE REVIEW OF STAY ORDERS
Absent outright dismissal of the federal action, the district
court's grant or denial of a stay does not ordinarily result in a
final order, and hence is generally not appealable. 4 1 Litigants
35 Id. at 817.
36 Id.
37 Id. at 818. The decisive exceptional circumstance in Colorado River was the clear con-
gressional policy underlying the McCarran Amendment, 43 U.S.C. § 666 (1976), of avoid-
ing piecemeal litigation of water rights. 424 U.S. at 819-20. The Court also suggested that
an exceptional circumstance would arise if jurisdiction in the state and federal actions was
in rem or quasi-in-rem. In such cases, "the court first assuming jurisdiction over property
may exercise that jurisdiction to the exclusion of other courts." Id. at 818.
" See 424 U.S. at 818-19. For a model indicating how and when a district court should
grant a stay under the Colorado River standard, see Note, Federal Court Stays and Dismissals In
Deference to Parallel State Court Proceedings: The Impact of Colorado River, 44 U. Cm. L. REv.
641, 665-79 (1977).
39 424 U.S. at 820.
4" Id. at 818. Cf. HART & WECHSLEa, supra note 11, at 997 (suggesting factors for
abstention analysis); Schoanfeld, American Federalism and the Abstention Doctrine in the Supreme
Court, 73 DICK. L. Rv. 605, 634-35 (1969) (same).
4 Ever since the adoption of the Judiciary Act of 1789 only final decisions have been
appealable, with few exceptions. A final decision "ends the litigation on the merits and
leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment." Catlin v. United States, 324
U.S. 229, 233 (1945). Appellate courts usually refuse to treat a district court's ruling on a
motion to stay the federal proceeding as a final order, because after the state court has
entered a judgment, the federal plaintiff can return to the forum that issued the stay and
litigate his unsettled claims. Nevertheless, three theories may support the appeal of a stay
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who seek review of a stay order normally have only one key to the
appellate courthouse door: a petition for a writ of mandamus. But
federal courts have traditionally limited use of the writ, recogniz-
ing its "drastic and extraordinary" nature. 42  This tight-fisted ap-
proach stems from the final judgment rule, which avoids ineffi-
cient, expensive piecemeal appeals by requiring litigants to endure
the effects of erroneous interlocutory orders.43
In Roche v. Evaporated Milk Association,44 the Supreme Court
identified two formal requirements for the issuance of mandamus.
order. First, if the stay effectively terminates the action, it may satisfy the final order re-
quirement of 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1976). See Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp. v. Epstein,
370 U.S. 713, 715 n.2 (1962) (stay order appealable where no corresponding litigation
pending in state court). Accord, Druker v. Sullivan, 458 F.2d 1272, 1274 n.3 (1st Cir. 1972);
Amdur v. Lizars, 372 F.2d 103 (4th Cir. 1967).
Second, 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) (1976) permits an appeal from "interlocutory orders of
the district courts ... granting, continuing, modifying, refusing or dissolving injunctions,
or refusing to dissolve or modify injunctions, except where a direct review may be had in
the Supreme Court." Id. In Enelow v. New York Life Ins. Co., 293 U.S. 379, 382-83
(1935), the Court treated an order that-stayed a federal action at law pending the trial of
an equitable issue as one granting an injunction. See generally Mayton, Ersatz Federalism
Under the Anti-Injunction Statute, 78 COLUM. L. REv. 330 (1978). But in City of Thibodaux v.
Louisiana Power and Light Co., 360 U.S. 25 (1959), the Supreme Court avoided review of
a similar construction of § 1292(a)(1) by holding that the trial court's stay order was
proper. Since Thibodaux the appealability of abstention orders under § 1292(a)(1) has re-
mained uncertain.
Third, a litigant may appeal an abstention order by obtaining certification from the
judge that issued the order and applying to the court of appeals for review under 28
U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1976). See Public Employees Local 1279 v. Alabama, 453 F.2d 922 (5th
Cir. 1972). Appeal via certification, however, is available only when the district judge be-
lieves that the stay order "involves a controlling question of law as to which there is sub-
stantial ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal from the order
may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation." 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b)
(1976). Moreover, the circuit court must ratify this certification. Id. Since stay orders sel-
dom involve "controlling questions of law" and appellate review usually would not "mate-
rially advance the litigation," certification rarely offers an alternative in abstention cases.
But see Calvert Fire Ins. Co. v. American Mut. Reins. Co., 459 F. Supp. 859, 866 (1978).
For an example of an unchallenged denial of certification, see Will v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co.,
437 U.S. 655, 660 (1978). For a discussion of problems concerning the appealability of
federal abstention orders, see Note, Appealability of Abstention Orders, 10 IND. L. REv. 556
(1977); Note, Appellate Review of Stay Orders in the Federal Courts, 72 COLUM. L. REv. 518
(1972). See generally HART & WECHSLER, supra note 11, n.12 at 1564-72; Field, supra note 8,
at 1108 n.123.
42 Ex parte Fahey, 332 U.S. 258, 259 (1947). Cf Kerr v. United States Dist. Court, 426
U.S. 394, 403 (1976) (mandamus should not issue where other means of relief available).
4' See Will v. United States, 389 U.S. 90, 98 n.6 (1967); Cobbledick v. United States,
309 U.S. 323, 325 (1940); notes 78-86 and accompanying text infra. See generally, Crick, The
Final Judgment Rule As a Basis for Appeal, 41 YALE L.J. 539 (1932). For a discussion of the
harmful effects of liberal use of mandamus on the final order rule, see Bell, The Federal
Appellate Courts and the All Writs Act, 23 S.W.L.J. 858 (1969); Wright, The Doubtful Omni-
science of Appellate Courts, 41 MINN. L. REv. 751, 771-78 (1957).
44 319 U.S. 21 (1943).
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First, the reviewing court must have jurisdiction. The All Writs
Act confers jurisdiction on appellate courts to issue the writ when
"necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdic-
tions." 45 Interpreting this language, Roche said that "authority is
not confined to the issuance of writs in aid of a jurisdiction al-
ready acquired by appeal but extends to those cases which are
within its appellate jurisdiction although no appeal has been per-
fected." 4 Few cases properly before the district court would fail
to satisfy this jurisdictional test.47  Second, although the Roche
Court recognized that the issuance of a common-law writ is com-
mitted to the discretion of the appellate court,48 it offered some
guidance in defining the boundaries of that discretion: "The tra-
ditional use of the writ in aid of appellate jurisdiction ... has been
to confine an inferior court to a lawful exercise of its prescribed
jurisdiction or to compel it to exercise its authority when it is its
duty to do so." 49 Under the Roche formula, the propriety of the
writ's issuance thus depends on unauthorized action by the district
court.
In the thirty-five years since Roche, the Supreme Court has
couched its principal mandamus decisions in the terms used by
that case.5" During this period, however, the Court's position on
the availability of mandamus has fluctuated considerably. Repeti-
tion of the Roche formula has often obscured its approach to
45 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (1976).
46 319 U.S. at 25. "Otherwise, the appellate jurisdiction would be defeated and the
purpose of the statute authorizing the writ thwarted by unauthorized action of the district
court obstructing the appeal." Id. For a discussion of appellate jurisdiction to issue the writ,
see Chandler v. Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit, 398 U.S. 74, 111-17 (1970) (concur-
ring opinion, Harlan, J.).
47 For a case that would fail to meet this test, see note 52 infra.
48 319 U.S. at 25. The Court analogized appellate discretion to issue writs of man-
damus to judicial discretion to fashion equitable remedies. See Parr v. United States, 351
U.S. 513, 520 (1956).
49 319 U.S. at 26.
50 See, e.g., Kerr v. United States Dist. Court, 426 U.S. 394, 402 (1976); Thermtron
Prods., Inc. v. Hermansdorfer, 423 U.S. 336, 352 (1976); Chandler v. Judicial Council of
the Tenth Circuit, 398 U.S. 74, 114 (1970); Will v. United States, 389 U.S. 90, 95 (1967);
Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U.S. 104, 109-10 (1964) (dicta); Platt v. Minnesota Mining &
Mfg. Co., 376 U.S. 240, 245 (1964); La Buy v. Howes Leather Co., 352 U.S. 249, 256
(1957); Parr v. United States, 351 U.S. 513, 520 (1956); De Beers Consol. Mines, Ltd. v.
United States, 325 U.S. 212, 217 (1945). On occasion, the Court has defined the propriety
of a writ's issuance in terms of an abuse of discretion on the part of the lower court. See,
e.g., La Buy v. Howes Leather Co., 352 U.S. 249, 256 (1957); De Beers Consol. Mines. Ltd.
v. United States, 325 U.S. 212, 217 (1945); Banker's Life & Cas. Co. v. Holland, 346 U.S.
379, 383 (1953). But see notes 132-34 and accompanying text infra.
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mandamus. Indeed, the Roche vocabulary has sometimes confused
the justices themselves; various opinions have used the terms
loosely, if not inconsistently.5 A broader theory of availability
than that suggested by Roche is necessary to rationalize these cases.
Three prerequisites to availability are implicit in the Court's deci-
sions. First, the petition must satisfy the jurisdictional requirement
of the All Writs Act. This requirement rarely presents an obsta-
cle.51 Second, the appellate court must determine the propriety
of entertaining a petition to review the particular category of issue
presented. Not all issues can generate the extraordinary cir-
cumstances necessary to justify mandamus.53 Finally, the appel-
late court must decide that the merits of the particular case sup-
port an exercise of its discretion to grant a writ.
54
The Court also requires that the petitioner allege and prove a
"clear and indisputable" right to the writ.55  To meet this stan-
dard, he must show clearly that his case falls within an appro-
51 Compare Will v. United States, 389 U.S. 90, 104 n.14 (1967), with Schlagenhauf v.
Holder, 379 U.S. 104, 109-10 (1964). The confusion at the Supreme Court level has fil-
tered down to the lower courts. See, e.g., In re Ellsberg, 446 F.2d 954, 956 (1st Cir. 1971)
(jurisdictional question tied to discretion of appellate court).
52 See notes 46-47 and accompanying text supra. Thermtron Prods., Inc. v. Her-
mansdorfer, 423 U.S. 336 (1976), however, shows that an appellate court does not always
have jurisdiction to issue a writ. Thermtron concerned remand to state court of a removed
action. The Thermtron Court found that Congress had intended to foreclose all means of
review if a district court had properly remanded in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c)
(1976). Id. at 343. Thus, if a trial judge remanded a case "on the ground that it was
removed 'improvidently and without jurisdiction,"' an appellate court would not have
jurisdiction to entertain a petition for a writ of mandamus to review that decision. Id. But
where the remand order issued on grounds not authorized by § 1447(c), as was the case in
Thermtron, then mandamus would still lie, in the discretion of the appellate court. Id. at
343-45.
" See In re Ellsberg, 446 F.2d 954, 956-57 (1st Cir. 1971); notes 58-85 and accompany-
ing text infra.
54 See Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U.S. 104, 111 n.8 (1964); United States v. Denson,
588 F.2d 1112, 1127-32 (5th cir. 1979); United.States v. United States Dist. Court, 444
F.2d 651 (6th Cir. 1971), aff'd, 407 U.S. 297 (1972) (after determining that it could enter-
tain petition because petition presented issue of first impression of extraordinary impor-
tance to all parties, court declined on merits to issue writ). Cf. In re Ellsberg, 446 F.2d 954,
956-57 (1st Cir. 1971) (unnecessary to determine what line of "exceptional circumstances"
cases would support entertaining instant petition for mandamus because district court cor-
rectly decided case on merits).
11 See, e.g., Kerr v. United States Dist. Court, 426 U.S. 394, 403 (1976); Bankers Life &
Cas. Co. v. Holland, 346 U.S. 379, 384 (1953).
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priate category 56 and that its merits justify mandamus. 57 The bulk
of mandamus adjudication focuses on the second component-
the propriety of entertaining a petition to review a given category
of issue. The Court has not always heeded Roche's limitation of
the writ to cases where the trial judge usurped jurisdictional
power or failed to comply with a duty to exercise it. Rather, it has
expanded availability by extending mandamus to additional
categories of issues. In deciding to add a category, the Court has
focused on the harm caused by the district court's action, either to
the litigants or to the judiciary's institutional integrity. Roche im-
plicated both these factors. The Court has also permitted circuit
courts to entertain a petition for mandamus seeking to vindicate
the seventh amendment right to jury trial,58 and one seeking re-
lief from sequestration of property in a suit for an injunction.59
Issuance of mandamus in these cases would obviate injury to the
parties. The danger of institutional harm has prompted the Court
to approve appellate consideration of petitions alleging judicial in-
terference with foreign relations60 and disregard of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. 1
When the Supreme Court decided Roche in 1943, mandamus
was rarely available. The Court had designated only a few
categories of issues that could be reviewed through a mandamus
petition. 62  Roche reaffirmed the traditional view that jurisdic-
56 See Will v. United States, 389 U.S. 90, 102-07 (1967) (insufficient showing of an
institutional need for immediate review through mandamus); Ex parte Muir, 254 U.S. 522,
534 (1921) (refusal of writ appropriate where lower court's jurisdiction merely doubtful);
In re Cooper, 143 U.S. 472, 506 (1892) (mandamus unavailable where exercise of lower
courts jurisdiction depended on fact not present in record at time of petition); Morrow v.
District of Columbia, 417 F.2d 728, 737 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (the clearer the lack of jurisdic-
tion, the more appropriate mandamus); Note, 86 HARV. L. REV. 595, 600 (1973) ("where
the lower court's jurisdiction [is] merely doubtful, or depend[s] upon a finding of fact not
in the record at the time of the petition, mandamus [is] normally unavailable") (footnotes
omitted).
'7 Thus, in the context of jurisdictional error, the Supreme Court has set up "clear
requirements ... in terms of the degree of error necessary before mandamus [will] lie."
Note, supra note 56, at 600. Moreover, mandamus is usually denied where another form of
relief is available. Ex parte Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 584 (1943). See Kerr v. United States Dist.
Court, 426 U.S. 394, 403-06 (1976).
"I See Beacon Theaters, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 510-11 (1959).
'9 See De Beers Consol. Mines, Ltd. v. United States, 325 U.S. 212, 220-21 (1945).
60 See Ex parte Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 588 (1943). Cf. Maryland v. Soper, 270 U.S. 9 (1926)
(mandamus issued to avoid judicial tampering with sensitive questions of federal-state rela-
tions).
" La Buy v. Howes Leather Co., 352 U.S. 249 (1947).
82 Before Roche the Supreme Court's analysis of mandamus rarely went beyond the
jurisdictional catagory which that case reflects. Nevertheless it had sanctioned consideration
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tional questions composed one such category. In 1957, however,
the Court dramatically expanded availability to permit general
supervision of lower court proceedings. In La Buy v. Howes Leather
Co., 63 the Court upheld a writ issued by the Seventh Circuit vacat-
ing an order of Judge La Buy that referred two private antitrust
suits to a master pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
53(b). The judge had not "refused to exercise his authority"
within the meaning of the Roche test. He had power to refer the
case to a master, because rule 53(b) leaves the trial judge discre-
tion to define the "exceptional condition[s]" necessary to justify
such a reference.64  Nevertheless, Judge La Buy's erroneous habit
of referring cases to masters without an adequate showing of ex-
ceptional circumstances 65 threatened harm both to the litigants in
the instant case and to the institutional interests of the judiciary. 66
The Court found that "supervisory control of the District Courts
by the Courts of Appeals is necessary to proper judicial adminis-
tration in the federal System." 67
In Schlagenhauf v. Holder,6 the Supreme Court continued to
increase the availaiblity of mandamus."9 Schlagenhauf vacated the
Seventh Circuit's order denying a writ of mandamus against
Judge Holder, who had ordered petitioner, a defendant, to sub-
mit to nine physical and mental examinations pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 35(a). 7" Although district judges had
of petitions for mandamus that sought vindication of the right to jury trial. (Beacon The-
aters, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 511 (1959)) and petitions that challenged particularly
dangerous district court errors. See, e.g., Maryland v. Soper, 270 U.S. 9 (1926).
" 352 U.S. 249, rehearing denied, 352 U.S. 1019 (1957).
64 A reference to a master shall be the exception and not the rule. In actions
to be tried by a jury, a reference shall be made only when the issues are com-
plicated; in actions to be tried without a jury, save in matters of account and of
difficult computation of damages, a reference shall be made only upon a show-
ing that some exceptional condition requires it.
FED. R. Civ. P. 53(b).
65 352 U.S. at 258. Judge La Buy had referred eleven cases to masters over a six-year
period.
16 Id. "But even a 'little cloud may bring a flood's down-pour' if we approve the prac-
tice here indulged, particularly in the face of presently congested dockets, increased filings,
and more extended trials." Id.
67 352 U.S. at 259-60. Despite this conclusion, the Court indicated that the All Writs
Act had not conferred on the Seventh Circuit "a 'roving commission' to supervise inter-
locutory orders of the District Courts in advance of final decision." Id. at 257.
68 379 U.S. 104 (1964).
69 But see Note, supra note 56, at 611-17 (arguing that La Buy has broader implications
than Schlagenhauf).
70 379 U.S. at 108-09.
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previously ordered plaintiffs to submit to such examinations, 71
Judge Holder was the first to direct such an order at a defen-
dant. 72 The Court held that his authority to issue the order was
questionable and that the Seventh Circuit thus properly consid-
ered the petition for mandamus. 73 In form this decision is con-
sistent with the Roche standard, but the Court had to strain the
traditional concept of unauthorized action to reconcile the two.
74
Rule 35(a), on its face, sanctions court ordered medical examina-
tions of any party. At most, Judge Holder misinterpreted the rule,
a type of error appellate courts ordinarily review after the trial
court enters a final judgment.
A better, but less traditional rationale may have motivated the
Court. The question of whether rule 35(a) authorized court-
ordered medical examination of defendants was novel and impor-
tant. Arguably, the benefit that district courts would derive from
immediate guidance on this issue outweighed the policies
associated with the final order rule.75  This rationale did not sur-
face, however, until the Court concluded that Schlagenhauf pre-
sented a power question. The Court then held that since the peti-
tion had been properly before the Seventh Circuit, it should have
considered two peripheral issues that also involved "new and im-
portant problems." 76 This aspect of the opinion has led at least
two courts to interpret Schlagenhauf as precedent for mandamus
whenever a petitioner presents significant and novel issues.77
Only three years later, Will v. United States 78 signaled a retreat
from the broad availability of mandamus fashioned in La Buy and
Schlagenhauf. In a criminal tax evasion case, Judge Will ordered
the government to furnish information requested in the defen-
dant's bill of particulars. The Seventh Circuit issued a writ of
mandamus vacating Judge Will's order. The Supreme Court as-
sumed, without deciding, that the Seventh Circuit's jurisdiction
71 See, e.g., Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1 (1941).
" 379 U.S. at 110.
73 Id. at 110.
74 See Note, supra note 56, at 615 n.86.
7- See note 43 and accompanying text supra.
76 379 U.S. at 111. These issues involved interpretation of the "in controversy" and
"good cause" clauses of rule 35(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
'7 See In re Ellsberg, 446 F.2d 954, 956-57 (Ist Cir. 1971); United States v. United
States Dist. Court, 444 F.2d 651, 655-56 (6th Cir. 1971), aff'd, 407 U.S. 297 (1972). See
generally Note, supra note 56, at 616-17.
78 389 U.S. 90 (1967).
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flowed from a possible future appeal by the government, 79 but
held that the appellate court had abused its discretion in granting
mandamus.8 0 Mandamus failed for want of an appropriate
category of issue. Since Judge Will had acted within the scope of
his authority in entering the order, 81 mandamus could not be jus-
tified under the Roche standard. Moreover, the Court found no
evidence of persistent disregard of the federal rules, such as that
which supported supervisory mandamus in La Buy. 82  Finally, still
ignoring the implausibility of its argument, the Court reiterated
that review of the petition in Schlagenhauf had been appropriate
only because the district court's authority had been doubtful.
83
Will failed to acknowledge the propriety of mandamus in cases
involving new and important issues.
In sum, the Court has vacillated on the categories of issues
that may justify a writ of mandamus. It has recognized a number
of categories, among them jurisdictional mandamus in Roche,
supervisory mandamus in La Buy, and, apparently, advisory man-
damus in Schlagenhauf. In Will, however, the Court adopted a
more restrictive approach to availability by reading Schlagenhauf as
a jurisdictional mandamus case, thereby undermining the advisory
mandamus category. Furthermore, the Will Court stated that
mandamus should not be allowed to negate the final order rule,84
a concern noticeably absent from La Buy and Schlagenhauf. The
Court, however, declined to decide whether petitions for man-
damus that arise in a criminal context have to satisfy a more re-
strictive standard than their civil counterparts.85
79 389 U.S. at 95 n.4.
80 Id. at 95 n.4, 98 & 107.
81 Id. at 98. The Court explained that the trial judge has "very broad discretion" in
considering a request for a bill of particulars order under FED. R. CRIM. P. 7(f). Id. at
98-99. (citing Wong Tai v. United States, 273 U.S. 77, 82 (1927)).
82 389 U.S. at 100, 107.
83 Id. at 104 n.14.
84 Id. at 96-97. In Will this argument had a constitutional dimension. Avoiding delay is
one purpose of the final order rule. The constitutional guarantee of a speedy trial gives
added importance to this goal. Moreover, Congress has limited government appeals in
criminal cases "at least in part because they always threaten to offend the policies behind
the double jeopardy prohibition." Id. at 96.
85 Id. at 100 n.10.
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Will v. Calvert Fire Insurance Co.
A. The Facts
The question of the propriety of a writ of mandamus to
quash a federal stay order issued in deference to a parallel state
action first reached the Court in Will v. Calvert Fire Insurance Co. 
86
In 1974, Calvert Fire Insurance Company notified American
Mutual Reinsurance Company that it had elected to rescind its
membership in a reinsurance pool which American operated.
American then sued Calvert in an Illinois state court seeking a
declaratory judgement that the pool agreement continued to bind
Calvert. Calvert answered that the agreement was unenforceable
because American had violated, inter alia, the Securities Act of
1933, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and the Illinois Se-
curities Act. It counterclaimed for damages on all of the grounds
that it set up in defense to American's claim except for the alleged
violation of the Securities Exchange Act's rule 1Ob-5 .87 Simul-
taneously, Calvert filed a complaint in the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois, asserting the rule
lOb-5 claim along with the other claims that it had raised in state
court. American moved to stay or dismiss 88 Calvert's federal
suit.
8 9
Judge Will stayed all claims except Calvert's rule lOb-5 dam-
age claim, over which the district court specifically retained im-
mediate jurisdiction.9" Although he heard oral argument on this
86 437 U.S. 655 (1978).
87 17 C.F.R. § 240.10-5 (1978). Because § 27 of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1976),
grants the federal courts exclusive jurisdiction to enforce that Act, Calvert could not seek
affirmative relief (monetary damages) in state court for American's alleged violations of
rule 10b-5. Despite this exclusive jurisdiction, state courts must recognize affirmative de-
fenses grounded on the Securities Exchange Act. In McGough v. First Arlington Nat'l
Bank, 519 F.2d 552 (7th Cir. 1975), the court explained that
while 15 U.S.C. § 78aa confines jurisdiction over suits seeking affirmative relief
under the Exchange Act to the federal district courts, it [does] not preclude a
state court defendant from pleading, and a state court from recognizing, an
affirmative defense of illegality under the Act. The Supremacy Clause [U.S.
CONsT. art. VI, cl. 2] would seem to demand this construction of § 78aa.
Id. at 555 n.1.
88 American labelled this ploy a "motion to abate." Id. at 659. Although abatement
pleadings are equivalent to motions to dismiss, see IA MooRE's FEDERAL PRAcTicE 1 0.219,
at 2601 (2d ed. 1978), the trial court treated it as a motion for a stay. 437 U.S. at 659.
89 437 U.S. at 659. American moved to dismiss because the insurance contract allegedly
was not a "security" within the meaning of either the 1933 Act or the 1934 Act. The
motion for a stay rested on the fact that the state court proceedings had commenced six
months before the federal action, and included most of the same claims. Id.
90 Id. at 659-60.
1979]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64:566
claim soon thereafter, Judge Will did not rule on the issue.9 ' He
twice refused to reconsider his stay order, and refused to certify
an interlocutory appeal.
92
Calvert petitioned the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Cir-
cuit for a writ of mandamus directing Judge Will to proceed to
adjudicate its rule lOb-5 claims.9 3 The Seventh Circuit issued the
writ and instructed Judge Will "to proceed immediately with
Calvert's claim for damages and equitable relief under the Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934." 94  The Supreme Court granted cer-
tiorari "to consider Judge Will's contention that the issuance of
the writ of mandamus impermissibly interfered with the discretion
of a district court to control its own docket." 95
B. The Decision
Two issues confronted the Supreme Court in Calvert: first,
the extent of a district court's discretion to stay a federal proceed-
ing, or to delay resolution of a claim over which the court retains
exclusive jurisdiction, in deference to a concurrent state proceed-
ing; 96 and second, the propriety of an appellate court's use of
mandamus to override that decision. Justice Rehnquist, writing
91 For explanation of this procedural history. see Calvert Fire Ins. Co. v. American
Mut. Reins. Co., 459 F. Supp. 859, 861-62 (N.D. Il. 1978). Judge Will's opinion on remand
suggests that he may have stayed all claims pending before him, including the rule 10b-5
damages claim, until the state court ruled on a potentially dispositive issue. See id.; note 112
infra.
92 437 U.S. at 660. An interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1976) is one of
three ways to appeal stay orders. See note 41 supra.
'3 See Calvert Fire Ins. Co. v. Will, 560 F.2d 792 (7th Cir. 1977). The stay order did
not apply to respondent's claim for damages under rule lob-5. See text accompanying note
90 supra. The stay order did apply, however, to respondents claim for equitable relief
because the state court had jurisdiction to rescind the pool agreement in recognition of a
IOb-5 defense. See note 87 and accompanying text supra. The petition did not mention the
claims contained in respondent's federal complaint for equitable and monetary relief under
the Securities Act of 1933 or state law. 560 F.2d at 794 n.2.
94 Id. at 797. The Seventh Circuit held that the lower court should not have deferred
to the state court because the "exceptional circumstance" requirement of Colorado River,
which was decided after the issuance of the stay, had not been met. 560 F.2d at 796-97.
For discussion of Colorado River, see notes 33-40 and accompanying text supra.
95 437 U.S. at 661.
96 A trial judge's discretion to stay a claim over which the federal courts have exclusive
jurisdiction was not directly in issue in Calvert, because, according to the plurality, Judge
Will did not formally stay the rule 10b-5 damage claim. See 437 U.S. at 666-67; text ac-
companying note 90 supra. However, as Justice Brennan argued in dissent, the trial judge's
delay on the damage claim had the same effect as a stay, if not a dismissal. Id. at 676-77.
From this standpoint, the issue was before the Court in Calvert. Furthermore, Judge Will's
opinion on remand suggests that a formal stay may have issued after all. See note 112 infra.
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for the plurality, 97 first examined the Seventh Circuit's issuance of
the writ. Although the plurality failed to address the threshold
jurisdictional issue, presumably jurisdiction obtained because the
Seventh Circuit could have entertained an appeal from the district
court at some stage of the case. 98 Justice Rehnquist concentrated
on the second component of the availability test-whether the
case involved a category of issue that justified granting man-
damus. Noting that "[t]he correct disposition of this case hinges in
large part on the appropriate standard of inquiry to be employed
by a court of appeals in determining whether to issue a writ of
mandamus to a district court," 99 Justice Rehnquist concluded that
mandamus could issue only if Calvert showed that it had a "clear
and indisputable right" to have its claims adjudicated in a federal
forum.100
The plurality concluded that Calvert could not make this
showing with regard to the category of issue presented by its case
because the trial judge had discretion to stay federal claims in def-
erence to contemporaneous state court proceedings. Relying on
Brillhart v. Excess Insurance Co. of America 101 and Colorado River, the
plurality endorsed this discretion to stay in deference to a state
court action, "even when matters of substantive federal law are
involved." 102 Discretion to defer, said Justice Rehnquist, has re-
sulted by necessity from congressional expansion of federal juris-
diction, which increased the likelihood of "duplicative litigation
and the concomitant tension between state and federal courts." 1
0 3
The plurality handily discarded the Colorado River dictum that
reminded courts of their "unflagging obligation" to exercise their
97 Justice Rehnquist announced the judgment of the Court, and delivered an opinion
in which Justices Stewart, White, and Stevens joined. Justice Blackmun concurred in the
judgment. Chief Justice Burger dissented. Justice Brennan also filed a dissenting opinion,
in which Chief Justice Burger and Justices Powell and Marshall joined. Each of the Calvert
dissenters numbered among the six-man majority in Colorado River. Only Justices Rehnquist
and White voted for the Court's judgment in both cases. Justices Stewart and Stevens
switched from the minority in Colorado River to the plurality in Calvert. Justice Blackmun,
the swing vote in Calvert, sided with the minority in Colorado River.
98 See notes 45-47 and accompanying text supra.
99 437 U.S. at 661.
100 437 U.S. at 662.
101 316 U.S. 491 (1942).
102 437 U.S. at 664.
103 Id. at 663. According to Justice Rehnquist, this expansion rendered obsolete McClel-
lan v. Carland, 217 U.S. 268 (1910), which appeared to support the issuance of mandamus
on similar facts. 437 U.S. at 663. The dissent considered this position a "flouting of McClel-
lan." Id. at 674.
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jurisdiction: "[A]n opinion which upheld the correctness of a dis-
trict court'sfinal decision to dismiss because of concurrent jurisdic-
tion does little to bolster a claim for the extraordinary writ of
mandamus in a case such as this where the District Court has ren-
dered no final decision."' 0 4  Nor, as the court of appeals sup-
posed, is deferral "equivalent to dismissal." 105 Calvert could urge
Judge Will to reconsider his deferral based on the progress of the
state case.106  Moreover, Justice Rehnquist suggested that the trial
judge's grant of the motion to stay was functionally equivalent to a
mere exercise of his clear power to set his own calendar and defer
the trial until the state case was completed; the stay was a mere
formality.10 7  Thus, the plurality concluded that the decision to
stay for purposes of convenience lies in the district court's discre-
tion, and "[wihere a matter is committed to the discretion of a
district court, it cannot be said that a litigant's right to a particular
result is 'clear and indisputable."' 108
Finally, Justice Rehnquist examined the propriety of Judge
Will's delay in deciding the claim over which he had retained im-
mediate jurisdiction.'0 9 Calvert claimed that the district court
had no power "to stay proceedings, in deference to a contem-
poraneous state action, where the federal courts have exclusive
jurisdiction over the issue presented." I" Justice Rehnquist agreed
that "[wihere a district court obstinately refuses to adjudicate a
matter properly before it," "' mandamus is proper, but pointed
out that the delay was not a stay."' Mandamus will not issue
merely to speed a trial judge's deliberations.
104 437 U.S. at 664 (emphasis in original). In Colorado River, the lower court had dis-
missed the entire action-a final order from which appeal was automatically available pur-
suant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1976). See notes 31-34 supra. The court of appeals thus could
"affirm, modify, vacate, set aside or reverse" the district court order and direct such
further action "as may be just under the circumstances." 28 U.S.C. § 2106 (1976). In con-
trast, the district court in Calvert granted a stay, which in this case was reviewable only by a
petition for mandamus. See notes 41-42 and accompanying text supra.
105 437 U.S. at 664.
106 Id. at 665.
107 Id.
108 Id. at 665-66.
109 See text accompanying note 90 supra.
010 437 U.S. at 666.
"I, Id.
112 Id. Justice Brennan, in his dissenting opinion, agreed that no stay had been issued,
but asserted that the delay had the effect of a stay. Id. at 676-77. Judge Will's memoran-
dum opinion on remand, however, seems to indicate that although he first refrained from
staying the rule lOb-5 damages claim, he later stayed "all proceedings," which presumably
included the damages claim. Calvert Fire Ins. Co. v. American Mut. Reins. Co., 459 F.
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Justice Blackmun, who held the swing vote, concurred on
narrow grounds. In his view, the Seventh Circuit's issuance of the
writ was "premature" because the Supreme Court had handed
down the Colorado River ruling after the trial judge's decision in
Calvert but before the court of appeals reviewed that decision. He
voted to vacate the writ of mandamus so that Judge Will could
reconsider his stay order with reference to the Colorado River
standard."13 Justice Blackmun parted company with the plurality
on the abstention issue because he doubted the applicability of
Brillhart. He questioned the plurality's reliance on Brillhart, a di-
versity case, since Colorado River, a federal question case, seemed
Supp. 859, 861 (N.D. Ill. 1978) (emphasis added). This apparent addition to the "sparse
record" (437 U.S. at 667) before the Supreme Court would have necessarily altered the
plurality's reasoning, if not its result.
113 437 U.S. at 668. On remand, however, the Seventh Circuit took its directive from the
opinion of the four dissenting justices, combined with that of Justice Blackmun. Calvert Fire
Ins. Co. v. Will, 586 F.2d 12, 14 (7th Cir. 1978). The court of appeals reasoned that the
grounds for Justice Blackmun's concurrence differed significantly from the plurality's posi-
tion. Indeed, Justice Blackmun agreed with the dissenters that Justice Rehnquist had mis-
used Brillhart by holding that the stay order was committed to the trial judge's discretion.
Although Justice Blackmun did not support the dissent's view that Colorado River con-
trolled, he did vote to remand so that Judge Will could reconsider his decision in light of
Colorado River. Justice Rehnquist, on the other hand, stated flatly that Colorado River did
not control. Therefore, the Seventh Circuit concluded that the dissenters and Justice
Blackmun would at least agree that the district court should "reconsider its actions in this
case in light of Colorado River." Id. at 14.
Confronted with a confusing mixture of two Supreme Court and two Seventh Circuit
opinions, Judge Will reconsidered his order to stay in Calvert Fire Ins. Co. v. American
Mut. Reins. Co., 459 F. Supp. 859 (N.D. Ill. 1978). He indicated that his original decision
to stay was "not 'simply the product of the normal excessive load of business in the District
Court,' ... although that excessive workload is real. Rather, the stay is essential to assure
efficient justice to the litigants and to maintain the integrity of the two court systems." Id.
at 862. In an important revelation, Judge Will stated that Calvert's counsel had admitted
that Calvert had suffered no damages to date from its association with the reinsurance
pool, and that therefore Calvert's sole exclusive jurisdiction claim-the 1934 Act damage
claim-was questionable. Id. at 861. Judge Will then cited four reasons why Colorado River
did not prohibit the stay. First, "considerations of 'wise judicial administration, ... conser-
vation ofjudicial resources and comprehensive disposition of litigation"' counseled as much
in favor of a stay in the present proceedings as they had in Colorado River when viewed in
light of the "principles of fairness, efficiency, and avoidance of duplicative trials and ap-
peals of the same issues." Id. at 863. Second, Judge Will did not accept the dissent's view
that deferral of the exclusive jurisdiction claim was equivalent to dismissal. Id. at 863-64.
Third, he declared that it was "the clear intention of Colorado River ... not to limit the
district court's discretion" in abstention cases. Id. at 864. Finally, he interpreted Calvert's
filing of the federal action as a mere tactical maneuver designed to secure duplicative
adjudications, a situation not present in Colorado River. Id. In reaching this conclusion, he
noted that Calvert had failed to remove the state action to federal court under 28 U.S.C. §
1441 (1976).
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the more relevant precedent. 14  Moreover, he disputed the via-
bility of Brillhart's recognition of a broad discretion to stay after
Colorado River's more restrictive holding."
15
The four dissenting justices I" disagreed with the plurality on
both the abstention and mandamus issues. First, they stated that
the rule of McClellan v. Carland,1 17 that "the pendency of an ac-
tion in the state court is no bar to proceedings concerning the
same matter in the Federal court having jurisdiction," 118 applies
with particular strength to cases like Calvert involving issues sub-
ject to the federal courts' exclusive jurisdiction. 19  The dissent
amplified Justice Blackmun's objections to the plurality's use of
Brillhart 120 and attacked its application of Colorado River, finding
no exceptional circumstances warranting a stay. 21  The dissenters
also criticized the plurality for disregarding the collateral estoppel
problems inherent in staying claims within the exclusive jurisdic-
tion of the federal courts. 122  Finally, the dissent asserted that
mandamus was proper under either the test of La Buy v. Howes
Leather Co. 123 or the traditional test of Roche v. Evaporated Milk
Ass'n; 124 they brushed aside as unrealistic the plurality's point that
114 437 U.S. at 667. Justice Blackmun may have felt that federal question cases present
the stronger case for retention of the federal forum, because federal courts are more com-
petent to decide issues of federal law. He had concurred with Justice Stewart's dissent in
Colorado River, which declared that "there was no justification at all" for the district court's
order of dismissal. 424 U.S. at 826.
115 437 U.S. at 667. In addition, the declaratory judgment statute upon which the Brill-
hart Court relied (316 U.S. 491, 494 (1942)) committed the decision to grant jurisdiction to
the trial court's discretion. 28 U.S.C. § 400 (1940) (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 2201
(1976)). No such statute was applicable in Calvert.
116 See note 97 supra.
117 217 U.S. 268 (1910).
"I Id. at 282.
119 437 U.S. at 670.
120 Id. at 670-72. The dissenters emphasized that the presence of exclusive jurisdiction in
Calvert further distinguished Brillhart. Id. at 672.
121 Id. at 672-74. The dissenters claimed that only "one of the four secondary factors
found to support the federal dismissal in [Colorado River]-the fact that the state proceed-
ings were initiated before the federal suit"-was present in Calvert. Id. at 674. See text
accompanying notes 38-40 supra. In so doing, they seemed to treat the Colorado River fac-
tors as the exclusive ingredients of "exceptional circumstances," allowing no room for mere
consideration of judicial economy. The language of Colorado River, however, is more
open-ended. See 424 U.S. at 818 ("a federal court may also consider such factors as . ..
(emphasis added).
122 Id. at 674-76. See notes 150-72 and accompanying text infra.
123 352 U.S. 249 (1957). La Buy sanctions the use of mandamus to correct a clear abuse
of discretion. Id. at 257.
124 319 U.S. 21 (1943).
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Judge Will had not actually stayed the rule lOb-5 damages
claims.125
C. The Uncertain Forecast
No soothsayer can with certainty predict the impact Calvert
will have upon the law of abstention and mandamus. The most
obvious hurdle to predictability is the failure of a majority of the
Court to agree explicitly on anything more significant than that
mandamus was improper, at least because of the peculiar timing
of the case. Justice Blackmun may have sided with the dissent on
the abstention issue, but this is not clear.12 6  Nevertheless, the ap-
proach of the plurality merits attention because lower courts will
almost surely apply it, at least until the Supreme Court next con-
fronts the issue.1
27
The plurality's discussion of mandamus indicates that Calvert
continued and accelerated the trend initiated in Will v. United
States 128 to restrict the availability of the writ. The opinion noted
that the policies behind the final decision rule militated against
the availability of mandamus,'12 9 extending to civil cases Will's bias
against interlocutory review of lower court orders in criminal pro-
ceedings.'10  Furthermore, Justice Rehnquist found that the peti-
tion for a writ did not fall within the Roche category because a
district judge does have the authority to order a stay of claims
125 437 U.S. at 676-77. Chief Justice Burger joined in Justice Brennan's dissent, but also
wrote a separate dissenting opinion. He found that a stay of a claim over which the federal
courts have exclusive jurisdiction, in deference to a state court proceeding, is inappropriate
regardless of the res judicata problem. Thus, determination of the res judicata issue was
unnecessary. Id. at 668.
126 On remand, the Seventh Circuit appeared to align Justice Blackmun's views on
abstention with those of the dissent. Calvert Fire Ins. Co. v. Will, 586 F.2d 12, 14 (7th Cir.
1978). Judge Will correctly recognized that the Supreme Court's disposition of the case left
the abstention issue uncertain. Calvert Fire Ins. Co. v. American Mut. Reins. Co., 459 F.
Supp. 859, 864 & n.4 (N.D. 111. 1978). See note 113 supra.
127 Some courts have already relied on the Calvert plurality opinion. See, e.g., Finch v.
Mississippi State Medical Ass'n, 585 F.2d 765, 777 (5th Cir. 1978) (Calvert held that lower
federal court may appropriately delay federal action until state court has resolved parallel
claims in pending case); Consumers Union of the United States, Inc. v. Consumer Prod.
Safety Comm'n, 590 F.2d 1209, 1219 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (Calvert invoked principles of comity
to justify deferral of federal claim in favor of state action involving same issues and subject
matter); Zellen v. Second New Haven Bank, 454 F. Supp. 1359, 1363-64 (D. Conn. 1978)
(Calvert reaffirmed holding of Brillhart that decision to defer to concurrent jurisdiction of
state court committed entirely to district court's discretion).
128 389 U.S. 90 (1967). See notes 78-85 and accompanying text supra.
129 437 U.S. at 661.
"' See note 84 and accompanying text supra.
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over which a federal court has concurrent jurisdiction. 13 1 At
most, then, Judge Will had erred within an area committed to his
discretion. Using language that has sweeping implications for the
propriety of entertaining petitions from all the presently ap-
proved categories of issues, the plurality opinion'stated:
Although in at least one instance we approved the issuance
of the writ upon a mere showing of abuse of discretion, La Buy
v. Howes Leather Co., 352 U.S. 294, 257 ... (1957), we warned
soon thereafter against the dangers of such a practice. "Courts
faced with petitions for the peremptory writs must be careful
lest they suffer themselves to be misled by labels such as 'abuse
of discretion' and 'want of power' into interlocutory review of
nonappealable orders on the mere ground that they may be
erroneous." 132
As applied in the context of a stay, this language admonishes cir-
cuit courts that "the District Court's exercise of its discretion ...
ought not ... to be overridden by a writ of mandamus." 13 3 Cast-
ing the decision in traditional terms, Justice Rehnquist stated that
"a litigant's right to proceed with a duplicative action in a federal
court can never be said to be 'clear and indisputable."" 134 If fu-
ture decisions give full effect to this language, it may eliminate the
entire La Buy category which allows review, on a petition for
mandamus, of an abuse of discretion that the trial judge has re-
peated several times. 135  Finally, the plurality never mentioned
the possibility of using advisory mandamus in Calvert, even
though its facts were well suited to that category.
3 6
Although future decisions may read the plurality's opinion
broadly, they need not. Justice Rehnquist may have only meant
that no case can fall within the jurisdictional category unless the
trial judge acted outside the area of his discretion. La Buy did not
focus on the abuse of discretion, but rather on damage to institu-
tional integrity caused by the repetition of error.137 By referring
to La Buy, Justice Rehnquist may have merely intended to re-
131 See notes 101-07 and accompanying text supra.
132 437 U.S. at 665-66 n.7 (quoting Will v. United States, 389 U.S. 90, 98 n.6 (1967)).
133 437 U.S. at 665.
131 Id. at 666 n.8.
13 See notes 63-67 and accompanying text supra.
136 The stay of a federal proceeding itself involved "new and important" questions of
law, and the Seventh Circuit could have formulated the "necessary guidelines" to resolve
those issues in light of Colorado River. See notes 68-77 and accompanying text supra.
131 See notes 63-67 and accompanying text supra.
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pudiate any attempt to read that case as precedent for jurisdic-
tional mandamus whenever a petitioner shows abuse of discretion.
In addition to its mandamus discussion, the plurality affirmed
the fourth branch of abstention and expanded it in the context of
stay orders. The plurality said that a trial court has discretion in
deciding whether to stay its proceedings in deference to concur-
rent state court actions as a mere matter of convenience to the
federal court. At the very least, the Calvert plurality attempted to
expand Colorado River's "exceptional circumstances" requirement
where abstention is accomplished by stay rather than by dismissal.
Unhappily, this distinction obscures the plurality's view of the
precise scope of the fourth branch. They proclaimed merely that
a district court has some discretion. By rejecting the use of man-
damus to correct an abuse of discretion, 13 the plurality avoided
deciding whether Judge Will had abused his discretion. Thus, the
opinion sheds little light on the fourth branch's bounds.
Nevertheless, some guidelines can be divined. By relying on
Colorado River, the plurality implicitly reaffirmed the factors cited
in that case that contribute to a decision to abstain: "[t]he incon-
venience of the federal forum, . . . the desirability of avoiding
piecemeal litigation, .. . and the order in which jurisdiction was
obtained by the concurrent forums .... ,, 139 Additional consider-
ations such as an overcrowded docket and scheduling difficulties
may weigh in the district court's decision. 40 Congressional ex-
pansion of federal jurisdiction, which leads to duplicative litiga-
tion, tension between federal and state courts 141 and overbur-
dened federal dockets,142 justifies this expansion of the Colorado
River standard, at least in the context of a stay.1 43
The Calvert guidelines grant lower federal courts confronted
with motions to stay a degree of discretion proportionate with the
138 Nevertheless, the result the plurality reaches in Calvert suggests that the importance
of the federal right may determine the bounds of the fourth branch of the abstention
doctrine. See notes 154-72 and accompanying text infra.
139 424 U.S. at 818. See text accompanying notes 39-40 supra.
140 The plurality cited these considerations not as factors, but as reasons why a district
judge has "wide latitude in setting his own calendar." 437 U.S. at 665. Because the plurality
found no difference between a district judge's decision to defer setting a case for trial and
to formally stay its proceedings (id.), the factors that determine the calendar may also affect
the decision to stay.
141 Id. at 663.
142 For discussion of the burden expanded jurisdiction places on federal court dockets,
see Tyler, Congressional and Executive Expansion of Federal Jurisdiction, 71 F.R.D. 229 (1976).
143 See note 113 supra for a trial judge's perspective on the decision to stay.
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impact of deferral. The discretion available in such circumstances
is less than that allowed in Brillhart, where both the underlying
enabling statute 144 and the fact that jurisdiction rested on diver-
sity 145 provided compelling reasons for a large grant of discre-
tion. In contrast, Calvert allows more discretion than Colorado River
where dismissal completely deprived the federal plaintiff of his
federal forum. Because a federal stay does not necessarily deprive
the litigant of a federal forum, 46 a district court's exercise of dis-
cretion is more appropriate on a motion for a stay than on a mo-
tion for dismissal.'
47
Thus, the Calvert plurality opinion expands a district judge's
discretion in two ways. First, by extending the fourth branch of
abstention, Calvert gives judges wider latitude in deciding whether
to stay an action in deference to concurrent state court proceed-
ings. Second, by restricting the availability of mandamus, the opin-
ion reduces the likelihood of interference from a court of ap-
peals.' 48 The district judge's enhanced ability to avoid duplicative
and piecemeal litigation promotes the efficient operation of the
federal courts.
D. The Unanswered Question
The plurality failed to respond to a crucial abstention
issue-the res judicata 149 problem raised by Justice Brennan's
dissenting opinion. Justice Brennan asked what effect, if any, a
federal district judge should give to a state court's determination
of a federal plaintiff's affirmative defense when the case returns
to federal court after a stay. 150 In particular, the dissent ques-
144 See note 115 and accompanying text supra.
14' See note 114 and accompanying text supra.
14' A stay would not deprive the federal plaintiff of a federal forum unless the determi-
nations of the state court bind the federal court. For a possible solution to this problem,
see text accompanying notes 154-72 infra.
147 See notes 104-07 and accompanying text supra.
148 Indeed, read literally, the plurality opinion would foreclose A11 review of orders to
stay duplicative claims through mandamus. See 437 U.S. at 665-66, 666 n.8; notes 100,
128-36 and accompanying text supra.
149 This Note, like the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS, will use the term "res-
judicata" to include the doctrines of merger (which extinguishes a victorious plaintiff's
claim on the merits and gives rise to a new claim on the judgment), bar (which extinguishes
a claim against a victorious defendant), and issue preclusion (which gives binding effect, as
between two parties, to any issues actually litigated and determined, and essential to judg-
ment in a previous litigation between them). Unlike the RESTATEMENT this Note will use the
term "collateral estoppel" as a synonym for issue preclusion.
150 437 U.S. at 674-76. See generally Einhorn & Gray, The Preclusive Effect of State Court
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tioned Judge Will's assertion that he would give collateral estoppel
effect to "the state court's determination that the disputed transac-
tion did not involve a 'security' within the meaning of the 1934
Act." 151 Two undesirable results follow from this position, ac-
cording to the dissent: (1) respondent would be deprived of a
federal forum; 152 and (2) "the exclusive jurisdiction given the
federal courts over 1934 Act claims would be effectively thwarted,
and the policy of uniform and effective federal administration
and interpretation of the 1934 Act frustrated." 153
The dissent correctly criticized Judge Will's position.' 54  A
dismissal or a stay coupled with full application of res judicata
could deprive the federal plaintiff of a federal forum. Denial of
Determinations in Federal Actions Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 3 J. Corns. L. 235
(1978); Liebenthal, A Dialogue on England: The England Case, Its Effect on the Abstention Doc-
trine, and Some Suggested Solutions, 18 W. RES. L. REV. 157 (1966); Note, The Collateral Estop-
pel Effect of Prior State Court Findings in Cases Within Exclusive Federal Jurisdiction, 91 HARV.
L. REV. 1281 (1978); Note, The Effect of Prior Nonfederal Proceedings on Exclusive Federal
Jurisdiction Over Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 46 N.Y.U.L. REv. 936
(1971); Note, Res Judicata: Exclusive Federal Jurisdiction and the Effect of Prior State-Court De-
terminations, 53 U.VA. L. REv. 1360 (1967).
151 437 U.S. at 677. On remand, Judge Will revealed the circumstances which had con-
tributed to his collateral estoppel decision: "We concluded, therefore, that Calvert's de-
mand that we decide the same questions already determined by the state court was in-
tended to delay the proceedings in the state court and to obtain two adjudications with two
possible appeals of the same legal issue." Calvert Fire Ins. Co. v. American Mut. Reins. Co.,
459 F. Supp. 859, 861-62 (N.D. Ill. 1978).
This collateral estoppel problem has plagued the courts for many years. Initially, the
Supreme Court had held that state court determinations should preclude relitigation of the
issues in federal court, even where issue preclusion effectively barred a claim over which
the federal court had exclusive jurisdiction. Becher v. Contoure Labs., Inc., 279 U.S. 388
(1929). Since then, the trend has been to limit the preclusive effect of prior state court
judgments. In Lyons v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 222 F.2d 184, 189 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
350 U.S. 825 (1955), the Second Circuit said that issue preclusion should not bar the reliti-
gation of an exclusive jurisdiction claim in federal court, at least "where the putative estop-
pel includes the whole nexus of facts that makes up the wrong." Even the treatment of
state court findings of fact was brought into question in England v. Louisiana State Bd. of
Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 416-17 (1964). But cf. Granader v. Public Bank, 417 F.2d
75 (6th Cir. 1969) (collateral estoppel appropriate); Vanderveer v. Erie Malleable Iron Co.,
238 F.2d 510 (3d Cir. 1956) (same).
152 437 U.S. at 677.
153 Id. at 675-76.
1'4 See notes 167-72 and accompanying text infra. At least the dissent correctly criticized
Judge Will's position as it appeared from the record before the Court. On remand, Judge
Will noted that the state judge had been present with him at the hearing on the meaning
of the term "security" and that Calvert's counsel had admitted that its 1934 Act damage
claim was frivolous. Calvert Fire Ins. Co. v. American Mut. Reins. Co., 459 F. Supp. 859
(N.D. Ill. 1978). Judge Will stated that he might not have issued the stay had the exclusive
jurisdiction claim been substantial. Id.
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the forum would frustrate the congressional policies underlying
the grant of jurisdiction to the federal courts in the given class of
actions.' 55  In the securities regulation field, these policies include
ensuring judicial expertise, creating a uniform body of law, avoid-
ing possible pro-business bias in state court, and using liberal dis-
covery rules.'56 The type of jurisdiction Congress selects for a
particular claim -concurrent or exclusive-indicates the weight it
gives these policies.
The existence of concurrent jurisdiction over a claim does not
necessarily mean that Congress would not prefer that a federal
court adjudicate the claim. For example, litigation in a federal
forum of claims arising under the Securities Act of 1933 would
advance significant congressional policies.' 57  Congress does not
value these policies so highly, however, that it will never allow
state court adjudication of such claims in the interest of con-
venience. On the other hand, Congress probably would prefer
that a state court hear claims that would qualify for federal diver-
sity jurisdiction. Litigation of diversity claims in federal court ad-
vances few federal interests.'
58
The res judicata problem is not insurmountable. A district
judge should refuse, of course, to dismiss an exclusive jurisdiction
claim in deference to a contemporaneous state proceeding, since
the state court would lack jurisdiction to hear the claim. Neverthe-
less, a delay in litigating the exclusive jurisdiction claim-whether
resulting from a formal stay or a heavy docket-could present the
district judge with a collateral estoppel problem if a state court in
the interim renders a judgment on issues that will arise in the
subsequent federal litigation.' 9 For example, Judge Will's delay
'55 See Note, supra note 150, 91 HARV. L. REv. at 1281-1296. See generally RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 68.1, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1977).
156 See 437 U.S. at 670 (dissenting opinion, Brennan, J.). Cf. Note, supra note 150, 91
HARV. L. REv. at 1282 (intermediate goals of exclusive jurisdiction to ensure vindication of
federal law). Pro-busines"s bias may arise in state court from a fear that strict enforcement
of the securities laws would drive corporations out of the state, causing serious harm to the
state's economy.
157 See text accompanying note 156 supra.
"58 The House Committee on the Judiciary is now considering a proposal to withdraw
diversity of citizenship as a basis for federal jurisdiction. H.R. 130, 96th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1979). One commentator has proposed a "local option plan," giving each federal district
the opportunity to retain, limit, or abolish diversity jurisdiction. Shapiro, Federal Diversity
Jurisdiction: A Survey and a Proposal, 91 HARV. L. REv. 317, 339-55 (1977).
19 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 68 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1977) provides:
"When an issue of fact or law is actually litigated and determined by a valid and final
judgment, and the determination is essential to the judgment, the determination is conclu-
sive in a subsequent action between the parties, whether on the same or a different claim."
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in adjudicating respondent's 1934 Act damage claim triggered this
problem in Calvert.'60 By considering the res judicata implica-
tions of his initial decision to dismiss, stay, or proceed with a fed-
eral action, 161 a district judge can minimize the collateral estoppel
problem. When a judge stays particular claims in deference to
contemporaneous state proceedings, the res judicata effects that
will ensue if the case returns to federal court after the state
forum's judgment should be expected and palatable. Any concur-
rent jurisdiction claims that the federal court stays 162 and the
state court actually adjudicates will be barred from relitigation. 163
The plaintiff may assert a concurrent jurisdiction claim that the
state court did not adjudicate. But if any issues that the state court
did litigate arise in the adjudication of that claim, the federal
court should give full collateral estoppel effect to the state court
determination of those issues-whether of law or of fact.' 64  If
these res judicata effects pose an intolerable danger to the federal
policies underlying the relevant jurisdictional statute the judge
should refuse to grant the stay.
1 65
The fact that a federal court adjudicates the second action does not of itself affect the
application of this rule. See id. at § 68.1, Comment on Clause (c); 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1976).
Although the Calvert plurality and dissenting opinions quarrelled over whether Judge
Will's delay in deciding Calvert's 1934 Act damages claim was equivalent to a stay (see notes
91 & 112 and accompanying text supra), the matter does not affect collateral estoppel. A
district judge must confront the same collateral estoppel question under RESTATEMENT § 68
whether he stayed the exclusive jurisdiction claim in deference to a concurrent state court
proceeding, whether he merely delayed his decision on that claim until after the state court
entered its judgment, or whether the plaintiff filed the federal action after the state court
entered itsjudgment. Moreover, the res judicata defense arises as soon as the trial judge in
the first action enters a final decision on the issue. Calvert Fire Ins. Co. v. American Mut.
Reins. Co., 459 F. Supp. 859, 865 n.7 (N.D. Ill. 1978).
160 See 437 U.S. at 668, 677.
161 The judge would analyze the res judicata implications along with the factors dis-
cussed in the text accompanying notes 139-40 supra.
162 Calvert's 1933 Act damage claims are one example. See note 87 supra.
163 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 48 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1973) provides: "A
valid and final personal judgment rendered in favor of the defendant bars another action
by the plaintiff on the same claim."
164 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 68 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1977). This preclu-
sion would advance the policies underlying res judicata, which include ending litigation,
conserving judicial resources, and preventing harassment of litigants. See Vestal, Preclusionl
ResJudicata Variables: Adjudicating Bodies, 54 GEO. L.J. 857, 858 (1966). The second of these
policies also underlies the fourth branch of abstention and the doctrine of res judicata
makes the stay a useful tool for implementing this branch.
165 Even though a state court has concurrent jurisdiction over a claim, litigation of all
the issues essential to that claim in federal court might serve various federal interests. See
text accompanying note 156-57 supra. Therefore, federal courts making the initial decision
to stay may wish to allow the parties to reserve their right to return to federal court for
litigation of the federal issues. In Government & Civic Employees Organizing Comm., CIO
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The most difficult question of collateral estoppel application
arises if the case returns to federal court for litigation of an exclu-
sive jurisdiction claim after the state court has adjudicated issues
that will arise in the federal litigation. Three types of findings
could confront the federal court: issues of fact, issues of law, and
mixed questions of fact and law.' 6 '
A federal court should give preclusive effect to state court
findings that bear on the pending federal claim only to the extent
that such action will not frustrate the purposes underlying the
congressional grant of exclusive jurisdiction. 67  For example, in
Calvert, as the dissent noted, the federal defendant apparently will
return to federal court armed with a mixed finding of fact and
law arising from the adjudication of one of Calvert's affirmative
v. Windsor, 353 U.S. 364 (1957), the Supreme Court held that a federal court should
retain jurisdiction over a constitutional question until state courts pass on issues of local
law. Id. at 366. The Supreme Court clarified this procedure in England v. Louisiana State
Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411 (1964). In England, the Court acknowledged that
the federal plaintiff could explicitly reserve his right to return to federal court for adjudi-
cation of the federal question in case the state court held against him on the issue of state
law. Id. at 419. The federal question need not be litigated in the state court, but the federal
plaintiff "must inform those courts what his federal claims are, so that the state statute may
be construed 'in light of those claims." Id. at 420. Extension of the Windsor reservation to
the fourth branch would allow a federal district court to stay an action while ensuring that,
if necessary, it could adjudicate all the issues essential to a given federal claim. The state
court would decide the overlapping issues to enable it to reach a judgment in the case
before it, but collateral estoppel would not bar the relitigation of reserved issues. This
procedure would encourage courts to order stays, in the hope that the case would not
return or that it would return with fewer claims and issues, while providing the federal
plaintiff with full federal consideration of those issues more appropriately heard in federal
court.
166 See Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 309 n.6 (1963). Cf. Becher v. Contoure Labs.,
Inc., 279 U.S. 388, 391 (1929) (distinction between establishing fact and giving specific
effect to it by judgment).
167 The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 68.1(c) (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1977) pro-
vides for this refusal to give full preclusive effect to the state court findings: "A new de-
termination of the issue is warranted ... by factors relating to the allocation of jurisdiction
between [the courts]." The Comment on clause (c) offers an example of an appropriate
situation for a federal court to avoid according preclusive effect to findings of a state
court:
[A] determination in a state court action on a patent license agreement uphold-
ing the defense that the patent was invalid for want of invention would not be
held binding in a subsequent federal court action for patent infringement if the
Congressional grant of exclusive jurisdiction in patent infringement cases to the
federal district courts is construed to require otherwise. The question in each
such case would be resolved in the light of the legislative purpose in vesting
exclusive jurisdiction in a particular court.
Id., Comment (e). This rationale applies equally to the grant of exclusive jurisdiction over
securities claims.
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defenses-that the insurance pool did not qualify as a security
within the 1934 Act. 68 Judge Will should examine the conse-
quences of applying collateral estoppel in light of the policies un-
derlying the grant of exclusive jurisdiction for 1934 Act claims:
(1) providing judicial expertise; (2) creating a uniform body of
law; (3) avoiding possible pro-business bias in state court; and (4)
employing liberal discovery rules.'69 Because issue preclusion as
to findings of law or mixed findings of fact and law might conflict
with the first three congressional policies, a federal court should
relitigate those issues. 17 0  Giving preclusive effect to findings of
fact might infringe upon the fourth policy. 17' Such findings
should be open to relitigation, unless state procedures provide lib-
eral discovery or the federal judge conditions the stay upon the
use of federal discovery rules.1
7 2
118 437 U.S. at 677. The dissent warned that if collateral estoppel were accorded to this
issue, the result would deprive the federal plaintiff of a federal forum for his exclusive
jurisdiction claim. Id. On the other hand, if no issue preclusion applied, then the original
purpose of the stay would be defeated.
169 See note 156 and accompanying text supra.
'7v The federal defendant in Calvert might oppose this conclusion if the state court rules
against Calvert's 1933 Act counterclaim-to be distinguished from its 1933 Act affirmative
defense-on the ground that the insurance pool does not constitute a security. The defen-
dant would contend that the same definition of security applies to both the 1933 and 1934
Acts. It would then argue that the plaintiff voluntarily chose to litigate the definition of
security in state court by filing its 1933 Act counterclaim. Illinois has no compulsory coun-
terclaim provision. See Civil Practice Act of 1933 § 38, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 38 (Supp.
1978). The defendant would then conclude that the plaintiff had its choice of forum, and
therefore should not be permitted to waste judicial resources and harass the defendant by
relitigating the issue.
This argument is fatally flawed because Calvert really had no choice of forum. If
Calvert had withheld its counterclaim and filed its 1933 Act damage claim only in federal
court, it would have found itself preculded from relitigating the definition of security in
the 1933 Act claim. The source of the preclusion lies in the 1933 Act affirmative defense
in state court. The state court would construe security in the context of the affirmative
defense, and RESTATEMENT § 68 would preclude relitigation of the issue in a concurrent
jurisdiction claim in federal court. See note 164 and accompanying text supra. If the federal
courts extended the Windsor line of cases to the fourth branch of abstention, however, the
federal plaintiff could relitigate the issue in a concurrent claim. See note 165 supra.
The federal defendant may have a more convincing argument against relitigation of
the definition of security. Calvert had the power under 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1976) to remove
the entire state action to federal court. Calvert Fire Ins. Co. v. American Mut. Reins. Co.,
459 F. Supp. 859, 864 (N.D. Ill. 1978). The defendant could argue that Calvert's failure to
invoke the removal procedure estops it from relitigating the issues decided by the state
court.
171 Cf. Will v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co., 437 U.S. at 675 (dissenting opinion, Brennan, J.)
(liberal federal discovery procedures possibly crucial to resolve claims over which federal
courts have exclusive jurisdiction).
172 See, e.g., Aetna State Bank v. Altheimer, 430 F.2d 750, 758 (7th Cir. 1970) (following
Boggess v. Columbian Rope Co., 167 F. Supp. 854, 856 (S.D.N.Y. 1958)), overruled in Cal-
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CONCLUSION
The impact of Will v. Calvert Fire Insurance Co. on the federal
abstention doctrine and appellate review of abstention orders is
uncertain. The lack of a clear majority obscures the position the
Supreme Court will take on these issues in the future. However,
by endorsing abstention for reasons of convenience, at least in the
context of a stay, the plurality probably furthered acclamation of
the fourth branch of abstention. The forecast for mandamus is
less clear. Prior to Calvert courts had usually granted mandamus
in cases that presented issues belonging to one of three categories:
jurisdictional, supervisory, or advisory. One reading of the plural-
ity opinion suggests that the supervisory and advisory roles of the
appellate courts have been severely limited; another merely re-
stricts the availability of mandamus to correct jurisdictional
abuses. In either case, Calvert continued a trend toward reduced
availability of mandamus.
In practical terms, Calvert enlarged the discretion accorded to
federal district courts in the disposition of matters pending before
them. The plurality's position on abstention increased the trial
judge's discretion on a motion to stay; the restriction on the avail-
ability of mandamus reduced interference from an appellate court
on a nonappealable order. This Note has attempted to define
limits on the increased discretion to abstain, and to provide a
framework within which to assess the availability of mandamus.
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